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OPENING REMARKS
RONALD J. ALLEN ∗
It is a great honor to be asked to make some opening remarks at this
centennial celebration of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
(JCLC). On behalf of the Journal, I extend our greetings to all the
distinguished participants and our thanks for coming. On behalf of the
participants, I extend our thanks and admiration to the Journal’s Editorial
Board, which has worked tirelessly to put this interesting conference
together. To set the tone for the rest of the day, I was asked to give a bit of
the history of the Journal, to highlight the important developments of the
last century, to make predictions about the future, and to talk a little about
one of my favorite topics, theorizing about theory—all in the remaining
twenty-five minutes allocated for these remarks—and so I best move
directly to the task.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JOURNAL
In one sense, JCLC began as an outgrowth of the National Conference
on Criminal Law and Criminology held at the school in June 1909 to
celebrate the law school’s fiftieth anniversary. That Conference in turn was
a result of Roscoe Pound’s famous address presented at the annual
convention of the American Bar Association in 1906, “The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.” Building upon
his address and its impact, Pound was the primary organizer of the 1909
Conference. The purpose of the Conference was to bring together scholars
of both criminal law and criminology, practitioners, jurists, and public
officials to set out a plan for criminal justice reform, and it was the first
national conference in those fields. The participants comprised an
astonishing collection of talent, largely selected by the supreme courts and
governors of the various states, and it had equally astonishing results.
Some of the highlights include:
• At the close of the conference, delegates voted into existence the
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, the first of
its kind in the United States.
∗
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• The conference led directly to the first forensics lab. There was
some work done in the field of police science after 1909
conference. This led in 1929 to the establishment of a police
laboratory by Colonel Calvin Goddard that was affiliated with the
Northwestern School of Law. The next year, the American
Journal of Police Science was created, which in 1932 became a
section of the Journal, and the name was changed to the Journal
of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science.
• The concern for practical legal education expressed during the
1909 conference led to the creation of legal clinics in law schools.
• Most pertinent to today’s conference, the conference participants
called for the creation of a journal by the American Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminology, which would become the first
English-language periodical “devoted to the scientific study of the
criminal law and criminology.” And it remained the only journal
for a considerable period of time during which the Journal almost
singlehandedly kept alive criminology in the United States. It
was not until the decade of the 1960s when federal money began
pouring into research into “causes of crimes” and related topics
that the field built upon the foundations created by the Institute
and the Journal.
Here are some interesting facts about the Journal:
• It had the same Editor-in-Chief for fifty years, Robert H. Gault, a
professor of psychology at Northwestern, and finally transitioned
to a fully student-run publication in 1971 (the sixty-second
volume). However, the Journal retains a professional board of
criminologists to oversee the criminology articles it publishes.
• The Journal published its first female author in its second volume
1911.
• Notable authors, in addition to essentially every single productive
scholar in the fields of criminal law and criminology, include:
Booker T. Washington, J. Edgar Hoover, Dean Wigmore, Roscoe
Pound, Chief Justice Warren Burger, and Robert Kennedy.
• It likely has the record for name changes. Originally, it was the
Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and
Criminology. In 1941, it became the Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology. In 1951, it became the Journal of Criminal
Law, Criminology and Police Science, and in 1973 when the
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separate section on police science was eliminated in the sixtyfourth volume it became the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology.
Today it has the distinction of being the only leading journal in two
different fields, criminal law and procedure and criminology. Even though
it is a specialty law journal, and a complicated one because of the
criminology section, it is consistently ranked among the most influential
and cited law reviews in the country. And it actually pays for itself by its
large subscription base—second largest among all law reviews—which is
rarity among the nation’s journals.
II. IMPORTANT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST CENTURY
Anything can be viewed through an infinite variety of lenses. Some
might think that the Model Penal Code was the most important historical
phenomenon of the past century pertinent to the fields of criminal law and
criminology; others would focus on the rise and fall of the rehabilitative
ideal, and the commensurate rise and fall of both psychoanalysis and
behaviorism, with their implications for the meaning and treatment of
“deviancy.” And still others might focus on the federal interest in and the
federalizing of criminal law represented by the two great Presidential
commissions.
The first of these was President Herbert Hoover’s
Wickersham Commission, the popular name for the National Commission
on Law Observance and Enforcement, which published its work in 1929.
This commission conducted the first comprehensive national study of crime
and law enforcement in U.S. history. The second, of course, is The
President’s Crime Commission, which was created by President Lyndon
Johnson in 1965 and finished its efforts in 1967. Still others might focus on
the overuse of the criminal sanction in the middle of the twentieth century
followed by the blurring of the lines between criminal and civil law through
the use of civil sanctions and all their implications. And others would note
either, or both, the sumptuary nature of much American criminal law or its
overblown and archaic nature.
Each of the points above is critically important and a good case can be
made for their preeminence, but I want to suggest a different perspective. I
think much of what defines and has animated these fields can be organized
over two prohibitions, the rise of two political movements, and two wars (or
three depending on how you count).
The prohibitions were the related experiments with the legal
suppression of alcohol and narcotics. Everyone knows of the Eighteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1919, and not repealed until the
Twenty-First Amendment was ratified in 1933. Less well known is the that
the prohibition of hemp products and opiates was beginning at just about
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the same time and, of course, has largely continued to today. I think lost in
public awareness is that the secondary consequence of these prohibitions
was to generate monopoly profits for those willing to take the risk, and this
led directly to the rise of well-funded organized crime in the United States.
This in turn led to the public perception of crime waves, contributed to
political corruption, and put criminal justice on the map permanently.
National political campaigns, beginning with the 1968 presidential
elections, began to be organized around law and order themes, forever
changing politics in the United States. In one of the most perverse but
interesting of modern developments, these issues have now gone global,
with the real risk of nation-states becoming narco-states, all in large
measure driven by the astonishing amount of money that feeding people’s
illegal habits and desires can generate.
At the same time the consequences of prohibition were playing out,
politics underwent a second transformation in the United States. The
Eisenhower and post-Eisenhower years of optimism both gave rise to
beliefs in perfectionism of various kinds and opened the door for the airing
of grievances from both the repressed (racial minorities) and the disaffected
(the young), all within the frame work of social toleration that did not have
a clue as to what it had released. This directly led to the rebirth of
conservatism, which traces back not to Reagan but to Nixon, and the
politicization of criminal justice mentioned above. At the same time, the
turmoil unleashed in the 1960s and 1970s shocked much of America, as it
saw its children reject the very values that in their parents’ eyes had led
them to believe in the potential of society to advance, and to believe in the
possibility of moral progress. How quaint that all now seems as it has
become clear that the twentieth century is in some ways the counterexample to the possibility of moral progress, with human slaughter on an
almost unimaginable scale. But that is not what people here in the United
States were thinking then. It was time of optimism called into question by
the very forces unleashed by that optimism. This in turn surely was part of
the ground work for the Reagan revolution, which is very likely the most
seismic political shift the country has ever seen. Even today, the argument
is largely over how far to the right the modal voter is in this country.
Hovering over all of the social turmoil were two wars—the Vietnam
War and the war on terrorism (however many wars that is—Iraq,
Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda). The interaction of these phenomena is obvious.
The Vietnam War fueled the anti-government bias of much of the youth of
America, stimulated them to action, which in turn fueled the attack from the
right of much of what was constructed in the ’60s, from the Great Society to
the Procedural Revolution. The present wars are blurring the distinctions
between terrorism and war, and between both of those and crime. They are
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also blurring the distinctions between the war powers of the President and
his role as Commander-in-Chief with his obligation to faithfully discharge
the duties of his office and to preserve and protect the Constitution of the
United States.
III. THESE THINGS POINT TO THE FUTURE.
As everyone from Niels Bohr to Yogi Berra has said, predictions are
difficult, especially about the future. Some of the things I think we will see
are:
•

The continuing dismantling of the procedural revolution of the
Warren Court, leaving in place only right to counsel in death
penalty cases as a definitive marker of what once was. Relatedly,
we may have a reenergized originalist Supreme Court willing to
generate enormous dislocations in the name of the rediscovered
true meaning of constitutional language along the lines of
Apprendi and Crawford.

•

Great effort will be expended by both Congress and the courts on
defining the power of the President, the implications of war,
indeed the very meaning of the term in an era where the
conventional markers of an army, and thus a war, are missing—
standing armies, hierarchical command structure, and belligerent
nation states.

•

The continuing dismantling of the social consensus of the middle
of the last century coupled with a world in which a single terrorist
could unleash a dirty bomb or pollute waterways, or whatever, all
overlaid with national borders where hundreds of millions of
people a year cross both will lead to a reconsideration of the
implications of privacy, autonomy, and dignity. In this regard,
consider:


the ever-changing Fourth Amendment;



changing paradigms of policing from patrol to no-brokenwindows to neighborhood;



emergence of new theories of criminal law such as its
expressive function;



reconsideration of the meaning of equality whether directed
to the meaning of racial profiling (Muslims?) or how social
demands can and should affect different segments of society;



the globalization of crime and enforcement will continue,
whether it is Al-Qaeda, or the mafia, or a polluting
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corporation; tracking the money will become the single most
significant global crime fighting strategy; and


•

as crime goes global, and as solutions to social problems
come to be seen more and more as requiring the active
involvement of the central government, the federal-state
relationship will continue to evolve away from anything
anticipated by any of the framers of the Constitution.

And a predictions section would not be complete without
something about the continuing scientification of criminal trials,
whether as a result of enhanced DNA analysis, or what is less
well known by surely of much greater significance, enhanced
video surveillance that is emerging in part because of the
continuing technological advances.
IV. THEORIZING ABOUT THEORY

It was kind of the Editors of the Journal to ask me to close with a few
remarks on a research interest of mine, which relates to the limits of formal
reasoning. Normally, I would jump at the chance to complain about the
vacuousness of most “normative” legal scholarship, but that is complicated
here because the Journal is so empirically bent. Its criminology section is
peer-reviewed, and its selections for the criminal law section seem to me to
be appropriately skeptical of unmoored musings passing as normative
scholarship. So, I fear my standard sermon would be preaching to the
choir, and thus rather than give it, I will close with two related by more
discrete points.
The first point is that scholarship within the purview of the Journal has
neglected to its detriment the bracing nature and cold precision of
economics. Perhaps this is because of a belief that normative scholarship
can simply neglect such things as quantifiable cost-benefit calculations,
utility functions, and the like, and because even excellent empirical research
in some fields can be done without regard to them as well. Whatever the
cause, the consequence is regrettable. One simply cannot argue about rights
in the abstract; there are always costs attached and reciprocal rights
adversely affected. Plea bargaining is a good example. Any distribution at
all between trial and non-trial dispositions could be socially optimal. Trials
may have their unique values, but nonetheless those values compete with
others. Surely one of the points of criminal dispositions is to affect primary
behavior, and how that is most efficiently done is equally surely pertinent to
how to spend resources. Maybe more trials would be a wonderful way to
vindicate individual rights, but how much is that vindication worth? Trials
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compete for resources with other uses that also impact the most cherished
of values. How do the values here compete with greater funding for
schools, roads, or medical research? This is an example of what Larry
Laudan and I have referred to in a series of articles as the deadly dilemma
of governing. Every governmental choice has life and death implications,
not just trials—even where you build a road or how to distribute medical
research funds—or whether to permit plea bargaining.
The second area that has been neglected is what increasingly
dominates many areas of science and philosophy, and that is the
implications of complexity. I will mention two of those implications. First,
things are always more complicated than they appear. This is related to the
point above, but let me give you another example. It is conventional that
proof beyond reasonable doubt skews errors in favor of acquitting the guilty
in order to protect innocent people, but in fact there is no necessary
relationship between a burden of persuasion and outcomes. That
relationship depends on base rates and assessments of probability. If no
innocent people go to trial, no innocent person will be convicted, and vice
versa; if no guilty people go to trial, no guilty person will be wrongfully
acquitted. That means the common justification for things like proof
beyond reasonable doubt—that it protects the innocent by sacrificing true
convictions—makes almost literally no sense. Suppose, for example, that
there are nine wrongful convictions out of every one hundred. To keep a 10
to 1 ratio of wrongful acquittals to wrongful convictions, one needs ninety
wrongful acquittals, leaving one correct decision. Thus, a system with
ninety-nine out of one hundred errors satisfies the ratio but seems quite
perverse. Or suppose there is a 75% conviction rate, and a 5% error rate.
In such a case, one needs thirty-seven wrongful acquittals to offset 3.75
wrongful convictions, but there are only twenty-five acquittals to go around
(and all of them need to be guilty). Thus, the ratio, literally, cannot be
satisfied leaving the conventional explanation of the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt quite incoherent.
My two points combine more generally as a vindication of what Oliver
Wendell Holmes said over and over—to wit that no general theory is worth
a damn—yet the law schools continue to pour out general theories. (I am
back to my general lament!) One of the reasons they usually—indeed
maybe universally—are not worth a damn is that the simple tools of top
down theorizing—usually deductive in nature—are inadequate to capture
the reality being theorized about, which is invariably dynamic. So, we have
the spectacle of one bad theory after another of the Fourth Amendment or
the Fifth Amendment or whatever, where “bad” means has no discernable
relationship to reality except to be enlightening of the normative
commitments of the writer. We need calculus, not just algebra, to make
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progress, I think, whatever that might mean for research in criminal law and
procedure and criminology.
Whether anyone in the room besides myself thinks in such terms, and I
know definitely that at least one or two of you who shall go nameless do
not, I cannot imagine a better collection of individuals than we have here
today to apply calculus to the domain of criminal justice.

